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  • Newsletter 69 - 08/04/2016 | MacroPolis
    Documents Newsletters Media Subscribe You are at Home Newsletters Newsletter 69 08 04 2016 8 Apr 2016 Issue Number 69 Not available Weekly You have to subscribe in order to view the newsletter content Subscribe About Contact Sitemap Privacy policy

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.newsletters.3867 (2016-04-27)
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  • Contact | MacroPolis
    by pressing F5 Most Popular Week Month Year Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Bailout talks inch forward as Juncker comments complicate matters 20 04 2016 Pension and income tax reform bill sets out 4 4 bln in new measures 25 04 2016 Greek 2015 primary surplus at 0 7 of GDP under programme method as Athens looks for boost 21 04 2016 Demand for hospitals reserves raises concerns about govt s liquidity position 25 04 2016 Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Greece seeks to finalise 1 pct of GDP in new tax measures to close review 06 04 2016 Leaked IMF exchange sours mood before bailout review resumes 04 04 2016 Range of issues unresolved as programme talks resume in Athens 04 04 2016 Four in 10 Greek firms thinking about moving abroad survey shows 06 04 2016 Tsipras raises debt relief at UN but refugee crisis may prove more pressing issue 28 09 2015 Greece eyes temporary solution to liquidity problem from Brussels Group talks 01 05 2015 Greece prepared to move on pension labour reforms but

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.contact (2016-04-27)
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  • Almost 50 pct rise for new unpaid taxes in 2014 as overall total rises to 73.8 bln | MacroPolis
    Friday You have to subscribe in order to view the article Subscribe Free Mobile Apps Subscribers can receive our weekly newsletter and flash analysis on mobile phones and tablets Just click to download Apple Store Google Play Store Tweets by MacroPolis gr Most Popular Week Month Year Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Bailout talks inch forward as Juncker comments complicate matters 20 04 2016 Pension and income tax reform bill sets out 4 4 bln in new measures 25 04 2016 Greek 2015 primary surplus at 0 7 of GDP under programme method as Athens looks for boost 21 04 2016 Demand for hospitals reserves raises concerns about govt s liquidity position 25 04 2016 Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Greece seeks to finalise 1 pct of GDP in new tax measures to close review 06 04 2016 Leaked IMF exchange sours mood before bailout review resumes 04 04 2016 Range of issues unresolved as programme talks resume in Athens 04 04 2016 Four in 10 Greek firms thinking about moving abroad survey shows 06 04 2016 Tsipras

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.economy.2145 (2016-04-27)
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  • Asking Greece to stack more austerity measures ignores past failings | MacroPolis
    another package worth 2 percent of GDP equally split between revenues and cuts 2 4 billion euros on each side Page 10 Papandreou s government had committed to 14 4 billion euros of fiscal consolidation and it was not even the end of the first quarter of the year When Greece signed the first programme with the eurozone and the IMF in May 2010 it committed to applying an additional 2 4 percent of GDP of measures by the end of the year on top the existing interventions Table 5 That brings the total fiscal effort of 2010 to a phenomenal 20 1 billion euros split between 9 9 billion in revenue measures and 10 2 billion euros in spending cuts This dispels another popular misconception that the austerity policies adopted by the government were mostly geared toward raising taxes In the meantime the deficit of 2009 had been twice revised upwards by Eurostat to 15 4 percent by November pushing up the starting point of Greece s fiscal effort by an extra 3 percent of GDP Based on the memorandum with the troika Greece tabled a 2011 budget that had an additional 9 2 billion in measures this time mostly depending on the revenue side with 6 6 billion euros coming from various tax increases and 2 6 from spending cuts Table 2 3 Following the revision of the 2009 deficit the almost 20 billion euro austerity dose of 2010 reduced the deficit to 9 4 percent of GDP The initial plan was that the 9 billion euros of austerity in 2011 would reduce the deficit by 4 9 billion euros to 17 billion 15 3 billion of that or 6 7 percent amount was interest payments up from 14 2 billion in 2010 Excluding the interest obligations Greece was hoping to reach a primary deficit of just 1 7 billion euros Table 2 2 Greece s programme started going off track early in 2011 when it became apparent that the volume and intensity of the austerity was stifling the economy and all assumptions were going out of the window Off track But 2010 set the tempo and the policy of stacking more measures was established In June 2011 and then in October of the same year Greece committed to an additional 7 5 billion euros of further austerity Table 9 Greece found itself running just to remain in the same spot in 2011 The Commission described the volume of austerity as follows most of the measures effectively served to counteract the upward drift in expenditure and downward pressure on revenue The former mainly results from an automatic trend increase in several large spending components such as pensions and healthcare the latter mainly stems from the recession but possibly also a deterioration in tax compliance The measures in 2011 reached a total of almost 17 billion euros which combined with the 20 billion of 2010 brought the total bill in the first two years of adjustment to over 37

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-agora.3929&cid=1171 (2016-04-27)
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  • Club Med in Washington | MacroPolis
    seek financial assistance from the international creditor community only two years after exiting its rescue programme Such a prospect speculative as it may appear at present does not make for smooth what if consultations behind closed doors in Washington during the spring meetings The case concerning Spain is primarily political and electoral After the inconclusive outcome of elections in December 2015 the different parties represented in the Cortes have not been able to form a new governing coalition The acting prime minister Mariano Rajoy declined the king s mandate to form a new government Meanwhile the high stakes negotiations of various opposition parties have come to naught during the past five months Time is now running out in Spain If the Cortes fails to elect a new prime minister by May 2 then the king will have to use his constitutional prerogatives to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections A return to the polls in Spain means protracted political uncertainty in the eurozone s fourth largest economy which will be reflected primarily in rising yields for Spanish bond issuance Last but not least Italy is among the Club Med delegation to the spring meetings In many respects it is the eurozone s elephant in the room in Washington For years Italy s largest banks UniCredit Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Intesa Sanpaolo have been confronted with contingency risks in the sector On numerous occasions they have had to contribute to government led interventions in order to rescue smaller financial institutions The latest case concerns a combination of private lenders charitable trusts so called Fondazioni and the state owned bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti sharing the burden of a capital increase in order to finance the bailout of the regional Banca Populare di Vicenza BPV The European Commission is monitoring if the public private bailout pact complies with state aid regulations At the same time the ECB as the single supervisory authority is observing the capital requirements of all participating banks The Achilles heel of Italian banks are their rising NPLs Exposure to NPLs on lenders balance sheets amounts over a fifth of the total loan portfolio Because the ownership structure of many Italian banks is based on foundations that control the parent company once a lender runs into major balance sheet problems the Fondazioni are not in a position to contribute on their own to the necessary rescue operation Third party intervention as illustrated by the recent BPV case is increasingly becoming the default option short of closing the institution As the climate for regional Italian banks worsens the government of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has had to register a growing list of institutions in need of wholesale restructuring The authorities in Rome are imposing losses on bond investors and shareholders while simultaneously calling on larger lenders to contribute to individual rescue operations But this modus operandi only reinforces domestic market volatility as illustrated by the dramatic decline of share prices of UniCredit Intesa Sanpaolo and others which

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-agora.3910&cid=1170 (2016-04-27)
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  • Tsipras plays to domestic gallery over IMF dispute | MacroPolis
    to view the article Subscribe Free Mobile Apps Subscribers can receive our weekly newsletter and flash analysis on mobile phones and tablets Just click to download Apple Store Google Play Store Tweets by MacroPolis gr Most Popular Week Month Year Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Bailout talks inch forward as Juncker comments complicate matters 20 04 2016 Pension and income tax reform bill sets out 4 4 bln in new measures 25 04 2016 Greek 2015 primary surplus at 0 7 of GDP under programme method as Athens looks for boost 21 04 2016 Demand for hospitals reserves raises concerns about govt s liquidity position 25 04 2016 Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Greece seeks to finalise 1 pct of GDP in new tax measures to close review 06 04 2016 Leaked IMF exchange sours mood before bailout review resumes 04 04 2016 Range of issues unresolved as programme talks resume in Athens 04 04 2016 Four in 10 Greek firms thinking about moving abroad survey shows 06 04 2016 Tsipras raises debt relief at UN but refugee

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.politics.3850 (2016-04-27)
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  • Athens in quandary over IMF as Fund's role in bailout is firmed up | MacroPolis
    director Christine Lagarde a day earlier You have to subscribe in order to view the article Subscribe Free Mobile Apps Subscribers can receive our weekly newsletter and flash analysis on mobile phones and tablets Just click to download Apple Store Google Play Store Tweets by MacroPolis gr Most Popular Week Month Year Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Bailout talks inch forward as Juncker comments complicate matters 20 04 2016 Pension and income tax reform bill sets out 4 4 bln in new measures 25 04 2016 Greek 2015 primary surplus at 0 7 of GDP under programme method as Athens looks for boost 21 04 2016 Demand for hospitals reserves raises concerns about govt s liquidity position 25 04 2016 Eurogroup decision on contingent measures debt leave Tsipras with tough task at home 22 04 2016 Greece seeks to finalise 1 pct of GDP in new tax measures to close review 06 04 2016 Leaked IMF exchange sours mood before bailout review resumes 04 04 2016 Range of issues unresolved as programme talks resume in Athens 04 04 2016 Four in 10 Greek firms thinking about moving abroad survey

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.politics.3853 (2016-04-27)
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  • What next for Tsipras the shapeshifter? | MacroPolis
    indicate that it was part of a long term or even medium term strategy regarding Greece s relationship with the IMF There are legitimate reasons for Athens to be sceptical of the IMF s involvement in the programme For one it is less inclined to trust Greek forecasts or even preliminary fiscal results than the European lenders This means that the fund for instance is reluctant to adjust its projection for a primary deficit of 0 6 percent of GDP in 2015 even though the Finance Ministry insists that the final figures show a 0 2 percent of GDP surplus This makes a significant difference to the amount of fiscal measures the government would have to take to meet the magic figure of 3 5 percent of GDP primary surplus in 2018 which was set as the target in the third bailout Also the IMF is more inclined than the European lenders to question the quality of some of the measures put forward by the Greek government For example it is against a heavy reliance on increases in social security contributions to meet pension targets preferring cuts to retirement pay and does not trust the projected fiscal results of a series of supplementary tax measures which aim to raise one percent of GDP including taxes on gambling and internet connections The IMF believes that the targets set by Athens are questionable because the introduction of all these new or higher taxes will stifle economic activity and bring in less revenue Thinking in purely political terms Tsipras seems to believe that the IMF s presence is detrimental to his prospects in the short term By pushing for more concrete measures now it will make it more difficult for him to get the fiscal adjustment package through Parliament and keep his coalition intact By trying to sideline the IMF he risks losing the strongest international advocate he has for debt relief but there is an argument to be made that the debt issue does not have to be settled now and that easing up the fiscal pressure now would benefit the Greek economy not just SYRIZA s prospects However a key element to the WikiLeaks transcript is the director of the IMF s European department Poul Thomsen describing the fund s readiness to accept a lower fiscal target 1 5 percent of GDP vs 3 5 if the Europeans provide debt relief It is true that the IMF would still demand credible and politically uncomfortable measures to reach this target but the adjustment needed would be smaller than the one that has been discussed until now There is also another important aspect to the complex equation for some of the eurozone member states Germany in particular the prospect of a Greek programme without the IMF is a non starter Merkel made this much clear following her meeting with Lagarde last Monday and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble gave his personal pledge to German MPs that the fund would be on board last summer

    Original URL path: http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-agora.3881&cid=1169 (2016-04-27)
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